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Abstract:  
This paper tests for the endogeneity of one of the main elements separating different 
models of intrahousehold allocations, namely the household information set. Based on 
unusually rich data, I find that split migrant couples in the Nairobi slums invest 
considerable resources into information acquisition through visits, sibling and child 
monitoring, budget submissions, and marital search. I also find potentially substantial 
welfare losses when information acquisition becomes costly, not only through reduced 
remittances but more importantly as families opt for family migration into the slums. That 
households invest in information when there are welfare gains complements a large and 
growing literature that seeks to explain intrahousehold allocations through more complex 
modes of decision-making. 
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I Introduction 
A large and growing literature seeks to explain the intrahousehold allocation of resources 
through more complex modes of decision-making than the standard unitary model, which 
supposes that aggregate household behavior follows from the maximization of a household or 
family utility function. A variety of different models have been proposed that can be broadly 
grouped under collective models (e.g. Chiappori, 1988), which assume efficiency but remain 
mostly agnostic about the precise process that gives rise to the distribution of bargaining power 
within the household; efficient cooperative Nash bargaining models with threat points (e.g. 
Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981); non-cooperative models, which rely on 
self-enforcing mechanisms; or some combination as in Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate 
spheres model, whereby the marital threat points are determined by a non-cooperative Cournot-
Nash equilibrium within marriage. Empirical tests to distinguish between the models are 
frequently difficult because different models may have observationally similar predictions (e.g. 
in Lundberg and Pollak’s model, under certain conditions, a redistribution of income will not 
affect demand, even in non-cooperation) and because of data requirements on assignable 
consumption. A common test, and rejection, is the unitary model’s hypothesis that household 
allocations do not depend on the distribution of income among household members (e.g. 
Browning et al. 1994; Thomas, 1990), while others have tested for efficiency of household 
behavior. For example, Dubois and Ligon (2003) find evidence of household inefficiencies based 
on food consumption expenditures among members of farm households in the Philippines, and 
Udry (1996) finds evidence of inefficiencies in agricultural production by members of farm 
households in Burkina Faso. 
The main goal of this paper is to complement this literature by testing for the endogeneity 
of one of the main elements separating the different models of household allocations, namely the 
household information set. The particular information set - perfect or imperfect – is frequently 
considered critical in determining which type of household bargaining process is likely most 
appropriate in explaining allocations. Empirical tests to distinguish between models take this 
information set as given. For example, efficiency is reached in collective and cooperative 
bargaining models in the shadow of full and symmetric information. On the other hand, if 
household members’ utility functions are characterized by the class of transferable utility, 
efficiency is reached through self-enforcing mechanisms without needing full and symmetric 
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information (Bergstrom, 1989)1. For other types of utility functions, imperfect information is 
generally assumed to lead to inefficient non-cooperative outcomes, although (more) cooperative 
outcomes can also be sustained as subgame perfect Nash equilibria in dynamic settings with 
premarital gift giving as commitment (Carmichael and MacLeod, 1997) or signaling devices 
(Camerer, 1988), or with altruism (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001). Indeed, Ashraf 
(forthcoming) finds that experimentally varying the information set and degree of spousal 
communication significantly affects husbands’ savings decisions.  Yet, if more information has 
indeed large welfare benefits by allowing cooperative rather than non-cooperative outcomes, we 
should expect that household members (or different households in case of inter-household 
allocations) should be willing to invest in information acquisition – monitoring - , even if this is 
costly.  
The assumption of full and symmetric information is arguably innocuous in many 
contexts of household decision making where couples have good information about each other. 
In the case of cooperative behavior around household public goods contributions such as child 
investments, information acquisition or monitoring for most couples will simply be a by-product 
of daily interactions. On the other hand, the reduction in levels of child support frequently 
observed among divorced couples are often explained in part by appealing to the notion that 
cooperative outcomes cannot be sustained if the non-custodial parent has very little information 
about the allocation of his/her financial support to the custodial parent (e.g. Weiss and Willis, 
1985). However, if child investments are important to both parents, we should expect them to 
want to want to share information on each other`s expenditures so as to enable cooperative 
outcomes.  
To investigate the endogeneity of the information set and its ramifications, this paper 
focuses on rural-to-urban migrant couples where the husband migrates but the wife and (most of 
the) children remain in the rural home. This is a common migration strategy in many agricultural 
societies that are urbanizing rapidly, and especially so in Kenya, where nearly half of migrant 
couples undertake this type of ‘split’ migration. Since the majority of migrants will find housing 
in one of the urban slums, the popularity of split migration can in part be motivated by the 
downside of joint migration. For example, most slums suffer from incredible amounts of litter 
                                                 
1 Bergstrom (1989) shows that under the implicit assumption of conditional (on the actions by the members) 
transferable utility, the utility possibility frontier in a 2 person economy (uh, uw) is given by parallel straight lines, uh 
+ uw = c(a).  
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and waste; 71% of households either dispose of garbage in open public spaces and in the river 
(WB, 2008), and levels of common illnesses (fever, cough, diarrhea) are two to three times 
higher than among rural children (APHRC, 2002). Urban living is also expensive, including 
access to basic necessities such as water, toilets, and food, and education. Still, split migration 
presents its own challenges. In particular, except for the predictions by the unitary and 
transferable utility models, we should expect inefficient non-cooperative outcomes to arise as 
split migration naturally gives rise to imperfect information unless couples are willing to invest 
in monitoring and improve their information set. 
The first goal of this paper is to test this hypothesis. Do split couples invest in 
information acquisition, and if so, how? The second goal of the paper is to look for evidence that 
inefficient allocations arise when information acquisition becomes costly due to exogenous 
variation in the price of monitoring or, conditional on the cost of information, when misaligned 
incentives between the spouses are more likely to give rise to conflict over the allocation of 
resources and time. And third, to test for the hypothesis put forward by Becker (1973) and others 
since that as long as people are forward looking, the allocation of resources within marriage 
should be an important determinant of marriage market behavior and vice versa. In this particular 
context, to test whether the information set within marriage is endogenous to marital search.  
The findings in this paper are based on two sources of primary data collection: first, thirty 
detailed open-ended interviews were carried out in 2004 among married couples (split and joint) 
in the Nairobi slums and two rural areas. These aimed specifically to understand if and why 
spousal monitoring is needed in their particular context, how monitoring is done, and what 
inefficiencies, if any, arise when monitoring is difficult or costly. These interviews formed the 
basis of a survey which included 1514 married migrant men (‘split’ and ‘joint’ (living with their 
wives)) in the Nairobi slums. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first large scale survey that 
captures in such detail the monitoring strategies of couples, including detailed information on 
(monitoring by) non-householder siblings, and combines it with detailed information on marriage 
market behavior. 
The survey data demonstrate that split couples indeed do not take the information set as 
given but invest considerable time and resources into monitoring, and thus suggest that neither 
the unitary model nor transferable utility adequately captures the behavior of these households. 
Split migrant men invest substantial resources and time monitoring their rural wives by making 
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(costly) short, frequent visits home, requiring their wives to submit budgets before remitting, and 
by directly involving their siblings in the process of monitoring. In return, monitoring siblings 
are more likely to receive support from the migrant husband than non-monitoring siblings. Rural 
wives also use visits to the urban area to monitor their husbands but rely neither on their siblings 
nor on networks of migrant people from the rural village who are living in the same slum as their 
husbands. Instead, older children, boys especially, will move to the urban area to monitor the 
husband’s actions. Consistent with a simple model of costly monitoring, husbands substitute 
away from personal visits toward sibling monitoring and budget submissions and wives will 
substitute away from personal visits toward child sending when travel becomes costly. Still,  the 
couple spends at least $119 annually on bus fares alone, which is nearly 25% of per capita GDP. 
Monitoring is similarly sensitive to the presence of sibling networks by the wife. For example, 
while husbands travel home less frequently when they have more siblings themselves who can 
monitor, they will travel home more frequently and are more likely to require their wives to 
submit budgets before remitting when their wives have more siblings. Hence, conditional on split 
migration, efficiency losses are being mitigated through costly monitoring (which, of course, is 
itself an efficiency loss relative to a situation of perfectly symmetric information).  
However, the remittance evidence is consistent with the assumption that in the shadow of 
imperfect information, non-cooperative outcomes with reduced transfers do arise. The likelihood 
of sending any amount of cash decreases with travel time. Also, if split migrant husbands are the 
sole owners of the rural farm, they will increase the share of in-kind remittances relative to all 
other land ownership types (e.g. joint ownership). Much of the efficiency losses may, however, 
be borne on the extensive margin of split migration as couples opt for joint migration into the 
slums when monitoring becomes too costly: a comparison of transport time, for example, 
indicates that the rural homes of joint migrants are, on average, almost 25% further from Nairobi 
than those of split migrants.  
Lastly, the paper also finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the marriage 
market is an important vehicle to enhance efficiency within marriage, both by enhancing the 
marital information set\ and through pre-marital transfers. Comparing marriage market 
information between split and joint migrants, the former are significantly more likely to have 
lived together and to have known each other before marriage. Split migration is also associated 
with fewer spousal siblings. The payment of in-kind brideprice is also significantly higher among 
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couples currently split and the families of wives in split couples were more likely to be poorer 
than the families of their husbands at the time of marriage.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights the implications of information on 
split household decision making in the context of three commonly used models (bargaining in 
the presence of public goods, the principal-agent moral hazard model, and altruism with 
transferable utility), and develops a simple model of costly monitoring. Section 3 describes the 
context in which split and joint migration take place in Kenya. Section 4 introduces the data and 
sample characteristics. Section 5 provides the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.  
 
Section 2: Information, Household Decision Making, and Optimal Monitoring 
From an economic point of view, marriage is a partnership for the purpose of joint 
production and joint consumption (Bergstrom, 1997). Reasons for marriage include increasing 
returns to joint production in the farm or household, sharing of household public goods (housing, 
children, etc), and risk sharing. These are extensively covered elsewhere (e.g. the surveys of 
Bergstrom, 1997, and Weiss, 1997). All these are likely important reasons for marriage in rural 
Kenya which is agricultural, livelihoods are subject to weather and illness shocks, and children 
provide an important source of pride, family labor, and insurance for retirement. From an 
economic point of view, the case of split migration can be represented as an intermediary case 
between two states: marriage and divorce. In split migration, the couple is still married but 
‘custody’ lies with the rural wife while the urban husband provides transfers in the presence of 
imperfect information. An example from Weiss and Willis (1985) illustrates the benefits from 
the marriage state relative to the divorce state in the presence of expenditure decisions regarding 
children. For a predetermined number of children, the couple decides on child expenditures q, 
and the couple’s private consumption cw and ch, respectively, and the maximization problem is 
given by:  
yccqucqwtscqhyuv hwwhccq hw =++≥= ),(..),(max),( ,,  
In this marriage state, the first order conditions satisfy Samuelson’s condition for 
investments into public goods, namely that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution equals 
the price of the public good:  1=+
c
q
c
q
w
w
h
h
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In the divorce state, if the wife is the custodian and controls the level of child 
expenditures, the (non-cooperative) allocation will satisfy: 1=
c
q
w
w
 
Clearly, 
divorcec
q
marriedc
q
w
w
w
w < so qmarried > qdivorce. This inefficiently low level of child 
expenditures arises because the custodian does not internalize the effect of child expenditures on 
the non-custodian. For example, if the custodial wife in the example has the following Klein-
Rubin-Stone Geary utility: )'log()1()'log(),( qqcccqw wwwww −−+−= αα , then she will 
spend tw Δ− )1( α  for each extra transfer tΔ  sent to the wife by the non-custodial husband. As 
Lundberg and Pollak (1995) point out, if the non-custodial parent is faced with such a ‘tax’ but 
also has the option to purchase the public good directly, then he will do so if the price of the 
public good faced by him is lower than the price when sending transfers to his wife. To attain 
Pareto efficiency in the divorce state, the transfers to the custodial wife would have to be 
conditioned on her child expenses; i.e. she would need to be presented with a Lindhal price to 
ensure she internalizes the impact of her expenditures on him (Weiss and Willis, 1985).  But for 
this to be able to happen, one of the pre-conditions is that the couple must have full and 
symmetric information. In short, taken to the situation of split migrants, we should expect clear 
gains from cooperation, but the ability to sustain efficient outcomes will depend importantly on 
the information set. 
Information is similarly valuable in a standard moral hazard model where remittances 
only serve the role of compensating the risk averse agent (i.e. a wage transfer). A well-known 
result of this model is that risk-sharing is being traded off with incentives to induce effort by the 
agent. The notation below follows the exposition by Dye (1986) and Holstrom (1979). The 
principal’s (i.e. husband’s) utility G is defined over x and private consumption w-t, where w is 
his wealth level and t are the transfers given to the agent (his rural wife). The agent’s utility 
depends on the transfer received and on her action a (“effort”) and is assumed to be separable: 
U(t(x))-g(a). Suppose output x=x(a,θ) is a ‘home good’ that is determined by the agent’s effort a 
and a shock θ. Output x could be farm output but may also include, for example, a measure of 
the urban husband’s beliefs that his rural wife is remaining faithful, which is based on news that 
he receives from others in the village. This news (and thus his beliefs) is influenced by the wife’s 
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actions a: if she socializes little with others in the village (but her marginal utility from 
socializing is positive) this may reduce village rumors and increase his belief she is faithful. But 
his beliefs can also be influenced by the action θ of someone else, which may be completely 
unrelated to a: e.g. someone decides to spread a false rumor about the wife’s extra-marital affairs 
because of a personal dispute unrelated to a. Since only output x – the village news, agricultural 
output etc. - is observed, the principal cannot infer the agent’s effort a. The contract can 
therefore be only conditioned on x.  
Under the usual assumptions on G,U, and g, a well-known result is that the principal is 
strictly worse off if the agent’s efforts are not perfectly observable (or deducible). The reason is 
that the principal must increase the average level of transfers to the risk averse agent to 
compensate her for the higher variance of transfers which are necessary to induce the optimal 
action while still providing her with the same reservation utility (Holmstrom, 1979; Prendergast, 
1999). Holstrom (1979) defines a signal s to be valuable if both the principal and the agent can 
be made strictly better off with a contract of the form t(x,s) than they are with a contract of the 
form t(x). As shown in Grossman and Hart (1983), the optimal action can be implemented at less 
cost in the more informative model. Note that the moral hazard problem will generally be 
alleviated if the agent also derives positive utility form the production of x, i.e. x is a public good. 
 
Multiple Signals and Costly Monitoring These two examples illustrate the 
importance of information and the difference information acquisition may make for split migrant 
couples. The model below provides a simple example of how information acquisition works if 
couples seek information as part of a utility maximization strategy. The example focuses on the 
husband monitoring but can be symmetric. Suppose that the husband has the option of obtaining 
a vector of signals v = [ . Signal d, “direct monitoring”, is the signal he observes through 
occasional visits to the rural wife. Signal s, “sibling monitoring”, is the signal he observes if his 
siblings follow the actions of his wife. Signals d and s are not observed freely, but can be 
purchased.  and  are the amounts of each of these monitoring technologies with prices  
and , respectively. The entire vector of signals v = 
]sd,
dm sm dp
sp [ ]sd, is revealed simultaneously at the end 
of the period. Thus unlike, for example, the set-up formulated by Dye (1986), the principal does 
not have the option for an ‘investigation’ and wait until some costless signal x is revealed before 
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deciding on purchasing additional signal(s) .xv−
2 The pay-off for investing in monitoring 
technologies is the higher utility obtained from sustaining the cooperative equilibrium as in the 
public goods example or obtained through more ‘valuable’ information on the agent’s action a 
(according to Holmstrom’s definition) in the risk sharing example. This is the main assumption.  
For simplicity, let = ( , ), the variance of the measurement error on the wife’s 
effort a, be a sufficient statistic capturing how informative (noisy) the signal(s) received by the 
husband are. It is known to both. If no monitoring signals are purchased, = (0,0) 
2
εσ 2εσ dm sm
2
εσ 2εσ 2εσ= , 
which is the upper bound on the variance. More informative signals will reduce this variance, 
02 <∂∂ imaεσ . The benefits from the contractual relation are given by B( ) = B ( , ). The 
cost C of monitoring is given by C =
2
εσ dm sm
ssdd mpmp ∗+∗  = C ( , ). Hence the husband will 
choose  and to maximize his expected savings S
dm sm
dm sm
3:  
sd mm
Max
,
  S = B ( ( , )) - 2εσ dm sm ssdd mpmp ∗+∗     (1) 
Two first order conditions: 
sdiforp
m
B
i
i
a
a
,
2
2 ==∂
∂
∂
∂ ε
ε
σ
σ       (2) 
Proposition 1  An increase in the price  of signal  will lead to a decrease in the 
amount  being purchased if 
ip im
im
222
ima ∂∂ εσ > 0 and under reasonable assumptions on the 
function B( ) 2εσ 4:  
sdifor
dp
dm
i
i ,0 =<       (3) 
                                                 
2Notice that this additional constraint can make the principal worse off if there is a cost to obtaining the additional 
signal(s). For example, suppose there are two possible output levels,  (high) and  (low), two possible effort 
levels,  and , and suppose that the probability of observing  conditional on  is greater than that of 
observing  conditional on . Finally, suppose that the optimal effort level for the second best constrained 
optimum is . Now, the state of nature is revealed and it turns out that the realization of x = . At this point, 
the principal would be worse off obtaining a costly signal to verify whether the agent indeed put in . Dye (1986) 
derives conditions under which principals pre-commit to ‘lower-tailed’ investigation strategies, which specify a 
number 
Hx Lx
Ha La Hx Ha
Hx La
Ha Hx
Ha
x such that if output exceeds (is less than) x , the probability of investigation is zero (one). 
3 I assume the income constraint on purchasing monitoring inputs is not binding on the relevant margin. 
4 Details of the comparative statics for propositions 1 and 2 are in the appendix. 
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The ‘concavity’ condition that 222 ima ∂∂ εσ > 0 makes intuitively sense since one would 
expect that extra monitoring will increasingly reveal less extra information about the wife’s 
actions. This proposition implies, for example, that a reduction in the price of sibling monitoring 
(by, for example, having more siblings available), should increase both the likelihood that one or 
more siblings is following the affairs of the wife and increase remittances to siblings (given 
by ). ss mp ∗
  
Proposition 2  An increase in the price  of signal  will lead to an increase in the 
amount  being purchased:  
ijp ≠ ijm ≠
im
0>
j
i
dp
dm
      (4) 
This follows from the first order conditions, provided ji mma ∂∂∂ 22 εσ >0. This latter 
condition is expected to hold since at higher levels of monitoring using one type of technology 
, an increase in another monitoring technology  will likely only lead to relatively small 
decreases in the variance of the measurement error. Intuitively, this comparative static implies 
that husbands whose rural homes are further away from Nairobi will rely more heavily on 
kinship monitoring by siblings  than travel home frequently . Remittances , to 
siblings should therefore increase with distance to the rural home.  
im ijm ≠
sm dm ss mp *
 
Proposition 3  If the wife lives together with the migrant husband in the urban area, an 
increase in the price of traveling home ( ) should not affect remittances to his siblings ( ). dp sm
0
int
=
migrantjod
s
dp
dm
      (5) 
When the wife lives together with the migrant husband in the urban area, the effective 
price of direct monitoring, , is zero, allowing the husband to observe a directly. Hence, 
distance to the rural home is no longer relevant as the husband is perfectly capable of monitoring 
his wife (and vice versa); the first-best outcome will be observed. Alternatively, the signal s is no 
longer valuable, (
dp
0
int
2 =∂∂
migrantjos
m
aεσ ), so investing no longer generates benefits.  sm
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 Proposition 4  The impact of increased monitoring on remittances following a 
reduction in  or  is ambiguous. Average remittances should decrease in the moral hazard 
model since more information enables the husband to make the remittance schedule less highly 
powered. On the other hand, if remittances are more motivated by public goods consumption, 
then more information should generally enable couples to more easily reach a cooperative 
efficient outcome with greater public goods expenditures paid for in part by higher levels of 
remittances
dp sp
5. Lastly, note that more information may also affect the type of transfer: the more 
informative situation should reduce public goods purchases done directly by the husband (e.g. 
sending the wife food rather than money for food) and instead higher transfers to the wife, 
provided the price she faces for the public good is lower and more information enables a more 
cooperative equilibrium in which she increases her marginal propensity to spend the remittances 
on public goods.  
 
Altruism The analysis so far has been largely silent on the impact of altruism, 
which, after all, is commonly assumed to underlie inter- and intra-household transfers. We might 
also expect couples and their siblings to simply value spending time together. Because of this 
potential importance, I consider three types of altruism and evaluate whether these are likely to 
give rise to observationally similar outcomes as the propositions above: (1) altruism by the wife 
for the husband; (2) altruism by the husband for the wife; and, (3) altruism by the husband 
toward his siblings.  
 First, suppose that in either model above the wife is altruistic. Because she internalizes 
(part of) the negative externality imposed on her husband whenever she deviates from the first 
best action, such altruism will simply reduce the marginal benefit from monitoring; the effect of 
complete monitoring (i.e. full observability) results in = 0 under both the altruistic wife and 
non-altruistic wife scenario, but for any given level of less than perfect monitoring 
2
εσ
WifeAltruistic
2
εσ  
< 
WifealtruisticNon−
2
εσ . Hence, such altruism will reduce the (cross-) price effects of travel time and 
siblings on the level of monitoring toward zero.  
                                                 
5 This does not necessarily hold: if the couple has transferable utility, they will reach a Pareto efficient solution with 
or without more information. However, if that’s the case, there should be no monitoring taking place. 
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The reverse, altruism by the husband for his wife is not as straightforward. In one 
scenario, one may expect altruistic husbands to remit home generously. After all, any action that 
generates utility for the wife, including deviations from the first-best action in the absence of 
altruism, also generates utility to the altruistic husband, making monitoring again less necessary. 
If Becker’s (1974) Rotten Kid Theorem applies to husband-wife relations, monitoring becomes 
unnecessary, but wives are less, not more, likely to deviate. Becker’s Rotten Kid Theorem states 
that “if a head [an altruistic agent whose utility depends not only on his/her own consumption 
bundle but also on the utility of other members] exists, other members also are motivated to 
maximize family income and consumption, even if their welfare depends on their consumption 
alone”. Notice how this contrasts with the moral hazard results obtained above. As long as the 
altruistic head transfers positive amounts to (a) selfish member(s), it will be in the member(s) 
self-interest to maximize family income; the principal-agent problem disappears altogether.  
A modified example from Bergstrom (1989) illustrates. Suppose both the rural wife and 
urban husband have transferable utility functions of the following quasi-linear form:  
 and , where + = I The husband’s overall utility 
taking into account his altruism toward his wife is given by . Output x = 
where 
2)(),( wwwww atatu −= xtxtu hhh +=),( ht wt
α)(),( whwhh uuuuU =
2/1)( θ+wa θ  is a random variable. As in the moral hazard model above, the husband’s 
direct utility, , depends positively on the wife’s action  (which translates into output), 
whereas the wife’s utility, , depends negatively on . The husband commits himself to 
allocating money income I between himself and his wife after observing output x. After 
substituting in this budget constraint, the expected value of the utility possibility frontier 
becomes E[u
hu wa
wu wa
h + uw] = I + E[ ] - . Notice that changes in I,2/1)( θ+wa 2)( wa θ ,and  will shift 
the (realized) frontier in- or outward.  Given the husband’s Cobb-Douglas function, he will 
commit to allocate money income ( , ) in such a way that for each 
wa
ht wt θ , the distribution of 
utilities is uh = ( ) ( )22/1 )()(*11 ww aaI −+++ θα  and uw = ( ) ( )22/1 )()(*1 ww aaI −+++ θαα . 
Since for each θ , the wife’s utility is proportional to , she will choose  
so as to maximize this expression. This is the Pareto optimal choice since it will also maximize 
the expression for u
22/1 )()( ww aaI −++ θ wa
h at each θ ; the altruistic husband would have picked the same  had he 
controlled not only the allocation of money income I, but also . Thus, under this “Rotten 
wa
wa
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Wives” scenario, there is no value in obtaining further signals on the wife’s actions, 
02 =∂∂ TheoremKidRottensmaεσ .  
Extending the model above to include altruism toward siblings as well as valuing visits 
can lead to predictions that are opposite to propositions 2 and 3. Suppose, for example, that each 
sibling i’s utility is quasi-linear and defined over private consumption  and a public good v, 
which is the number of visits the urban husband makes to his rural home village (where, for 
simplicity, all siblings are assumed to be living)
s
i
t
6: for i = 1..N. The (overall) 
husband’s utility is defined in similar vein as before:  = , 
where 
2/1vtu ss
ii
+=
),,( si
whh uuuU Σ ( ) ( ) αββ )( 1−Σ siwh iuuu
( ) 2/112/11 Nvtvtu sNisNisi iii +Σ=+Σ=Σ ==  is the sum of all the utilities of the N siblings. The 
budget constraint is given by + + + v = I. The expected value of the utility 
possibility frontier is now given by E[u
sN
i it1=Σ ht wt vp
h + uw+  sNi si
i
u1=Σ ] = I – v + E[ ] - + 
N . Again, utility of the siblings and the altruistic head (the urban husband), is proportional to 
this expression. Hence, it is in everybody’s interest to choose v so as to maximize this expression 
for each 
vp
2/1)( θ+wa 2)( wa
2/1v
θ : ( )22* vpNv = . Notice that an increase in the number of rural siblings N will increase 
the number of home visits. This contradicts proposition 2 where non-observability induced an 
increase in the number of rural siblings to decrease visits home. Like proposition 2, however, an 
increase in the price of traveling home will increase transfers to siblings. To see this, note that by 
the Cobb-Douglas nature of the husband’s utility function, it follows that ( )2/11 vtu sNisi ii +Σ=Σ =  = 
( )( )βαα −+ 11  * ( )22/12/1 )()( wwv aaNvvpI −+++− θ . Substituting ( )22* vpNv =  and solving for 
the combined transfers to all siblings,  = sNi it1=Σ ( )( )βαα −+ 11  * 
( )( )22/12 )()(4 wwv aapNI −++− θ , which is strictly increasing in .  vp
In sum, a simple extension to include altruism toward the siblings and valuing visits 
generates the same result with regards to the travel time home – transfers to siblings relationship 
but opposite predictions with regards to the number of siblings – visits home relationship. Also, 
unlike the moral hazard case where siblings of joint migrants do not have valuable information 
                                                 
6 The wife`s utility could similarly be defined. 
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on the wife, the positive relationship between travel time home and transfers to siblings should 
apply to both split and joint migrants if utility is defined as above.  
 
Section 3: Divided Loyalties and Split Migration in Kenya 
Kenya is a particularly suitable country to study the endogeneity of information in 
household decision making because there is good reason to believe that the utility gains from 
split migration with cooperation – which requires information in most models - are likely 
substantial relative to either split migration with a non-cooperative voluntary transfer equilibrium 
or a full(er) information joint migration  outcome that requires moving the family into a Nairobi 
slum environment.  
The population of Nairobi is estimated to double every ten years, making it one of the 
fastest growing urban areas in Africa. Much of the growth is a result of rural-urban migration 
into the city’s sprawling slums, which by some estimates is home to more than 70% of urban 
residents (APHRC, 2002; UN, 2004). As mentioned above, the poor living conditions in the 
slums make it an undesirable place for many to raise their families, providing an incentive in 
favor of split migration. Further, according to the anthropological literature, romantic love and 
conjugality – a couple’s personal relationship to each other – in marriage is only recently 
emerging, in particular among urban elites (e.g. Smith, 2001). This suggests that altruism is less 
likely to play a facilitating role in solving intra-household conflicts and couples must place more 
weight on information acquisition as a means to reach efficient outcomes. Further, because 
customary and legal law provide men with more rights to land and inheritance than women, rural 
husbands and wives have frequently different incentives over the allocation of time and 
resources. Marriage is usually patrilocal, and upon divorce/separation or death of the husband, it 
is not uncommon that wives are forced off the land, especially early on in the marriage (Human 
Rights Watch, 2003). And, as elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, it is not uncommon that men 
have more rights over the sales of cash crops such as tea while women have more rights over the 
use of subsistence crops. Hence, if there is a risk that a cooperative equilibrium will be difficult 
to sustain, married women will seek to insure themselves, for example by investing time and 
resources into good relations with their natal families whose assistance can be crucial in times of 
need.   
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These observations were supported by the informal interviews conducted prior to the 
survey. Women express concerned that husbands living alone in the city (although interestingly 
usually not theirs) have extra-marital affairs and forget their families. In general, however, 
women expressed little faith in being able to control the sexual behavior of men, although there 
did seem to be a social norm that husbands must provide resources for their children regardless. 
In the words of one informant: “Many of the husbands living separately from their wives end up 
finding a different woman. Having relatives around won’t stop these men, no one can control 
them. In fact, I know someone who married two sisters. Provided the men still take care of their 
families, there is nothing wives can do about this”. Women do, however, employ more indirect 
ways to circumvent conjugal conflicts. For example, Anderson and Baland (2002) argue that 
high ROSCA participation by women in a Nairobi slum enables them to protect savings from 
husbands’ claims. Also, some men mentioned that women sometimes send a first born child to 
live with the father as a way to keep an eye on him.  
Conversely, men expressed worry about wives living in the rural area without their 
husbands. Men expressed fear that wives will get boyfriends, use part of the remittances on 
private goods such as nice clothes or divert them to their in-laws. Also, being a mostly patrilocal 
society, husbands may fear that their new wives simply lack intimate knowledge and experience 
to manage the local farm productively. This reluctance to just remit money home and leave the 
allocation to their wives is supported by various anthropological studies from Kenya. For 
example, in a study of a Luo community in Kenya’s Nyanza Province, Francis (2000) notes: 
“Few migrants were willing to delegate financial responsibility and decision-making power to 
their wives. This reluctance stemmed from a deep-seated distrust of women’s reliability”. Not 
surprisingly, migrant men spoke of women’s “divided loyalties”. Similar patterns emerge from a 
review of several case studies from other parts of Kenya (Francis, 1998). And elsewhere, 
Ferguson (1997) notes in Lesotho: “[migrant] men […] accuse women of wasting money, of 
spending it indiscriminately, or even of giving it to their lovers.”  
 
Section 4: Data 
The analysis below is based on a survey carried out in 2004 with a random sample of 
1817 households with ‘eligible household heads’ in two Nairobi slums, Korogocho and 
 15
Viwandani7. The questionnaire for this survey was based on the  30 in-depth interviews which 
took place with households in one of Nairobi’s largest informal settlements called Mathare, and 
in two rural areas. Eligible household heads were defined as having being “ever married” and 
between the ages of 24 and 56 years old; i.e. heads of households who were married and lived 
with their spouse together in the Nairobi informal settlement (858 in total or 57% of married 
men); heads of households who were married but lived split from their spouses (who usually live 
in the up-country village) (656 in total, or 43% of married men); as well as heads of households 
who were divorced or separated (153 in total), or widowed (150). There was no stratification by 
informal settlement area resulting in 60% of respondents from Viwandani and 40% from 
Korogocho. The population of eligible heads was identified using a sample frame developed by 
the African Population and Health Research Center (APHRC), which has been conducting a 
Demographic Surveillance System in these communities. Table 1 provides summary statistics on 
the sample of split migrants. 
[Table 1: Summary Statistics] 
As shown in table 1, the average split migrant is 36 years old, his rural wife is 30 years 
old, he has 9.3 years of education, about a year more than his rural wife, and the couple has 3.1 
children. The vast majority, 92%, have access to farmland in their rural homes8 which are on 
average just over 4 hours travel from Nairobi. Not shown in the table is the fact that practically 
none of the children to split migrants aged 0-5, and only 2 percent of children aged 6-14, and 7 
percent of children aged 15-19 live with the husband in the urban area. The importance of the 
rural area is also underscored by the fact that virtually all migrants, 97% of split and 94 % of 
joint migrants, intends to retire in the rural home. 
Yet, a clear downside is that the husband and wife will live apart, usually for years at end. 
At the time of the survey, the average split and joint migrant had lived in Nairobi for fourteen 
years, while the spouses of split migrants had only spent 1.8 years living in Nairobi at some point 
in their lives, compared to more than ten years for joint spouses.  
Despite the long periods of separation, husbands are remitting relatively substantial 
amounts. The average split migrant remits approximately $23 every time he remits9, and is 
estimated to do so on average 7.2 times per year – or $165, equivalent to 17% of his annual 
                                                 
7Korogocho location, Kasarani division, Nairobi District; Viwandani location, Makadara division, Nairobi district.  
8 80% of joint households has access to farmland. 
9Or Ksh 1,749 ($1 was approx. Ksh 76).  
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income.10 A relatively inexpensive and safe way to remit would be the use of postal service 
money orders.11 However, only 15% of split migrants uses this despite the wide coverage of the 
postal services, their common use in other contexts (for example to pay many public teachers), 
and low cost; remitting the average $23 costs only $2.40 for express delivery, which is the most 
expensive option but still a mere 27.8 % of the price of an average return trip to the rural home. 
Instead, the vast majority, 91% report traveling home to remit, while about half report using 
relatives (54%) or friends (44%).  
Also consistent with non-unitary and non-transferable utility models of the household and 
consistent with the informal interviews, communication is important. Couples were reported to 
communicate in several ways. Among important means of communication, personal visits came 
first and were mentioned by 93% of respondents. In fact, the average split husband spends more 
than $92.4, or 9.5%, of his annual income on bus fares alone, traveling home at least 10.7 times 
per year. Women also visit their husbands but at not as often; they travel at least 3.1 times per 
year to Nairobi. Other forms of direct communication mentioned are “letters/email” (by 62%) 
and “(cell) phone” (39%). Indirect communication through kin is important too, with 
“siblings/relatives” (41%) mentioned slightly more often than “friends/neighbors” (39%).  
Lastly, at 7%, “children” are not mentioned as a common means of facilitating communication. 
The survey also showed other ways in which husbands acquire information about the 
rural home. In particular, 74% of split migrants interviewed require their wives to submit budgets 
of intended expenditures before sending home remittances. Those that require their wives to 
submit budgets live considerably further away from their wives than those that do not; 4.31 hours 
travel instead of 3.58, a (significant) difference. Interestingly too, wives that are required to 
submit budgets have 0.31 more siblings than those who are not, a (significant) difference of 
7.7%.12. Sometimes these budgets are verbal but often they are written, in the form of letters sent 
by the rural wife to the urban husband. In addition to visits and budgets, more than a third of the 
wives (34.5%) were reported to be monitored by one or more of the husbands’ siblings. In fact, 
almost a quarter of all siblings (24.6%) were reported to “follow the affairs of the home of the 
spouse, e.g. farm, activities, budget, etc.” Such monitoring is distinct from joint production. 
                                                 
10 Respondents were asked to report the amount, month, and year of the last three times they remitted. The annual 
amount was estimated by extrapolating the frequency of remittances to cover the previous 1 year. 
11 Recently, sending small (or large) amounts through the MPESA mobile phone service has become hugely 
popular. 
12 P-values are 0.008 and 0.062 respectively, controlling for language group and clustering on district. 
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Only 1 in 10 of siblings reported to be following the wife’s home affairs were also reported to 
assist the couple in farm or housework. Yet even with these strategies, information remains 
imperfect. Only 30% of split husbands claimed to know “exactly” how their rural spouses spend 
remittances. The vast majority, or 61%, claims to know it “somewhat”, while a small minority, 
9%, says “not to know it at all”.  The same holds for spouses, who have even slightly worse 
information about their husbands’ expenditures with 12 percent of husbands indicating that their 
spouses know exactly their expenses, 57 percent somewhat, and 31 percent not at all.  
 
Section 5: Empirics 
I now turn to the multivariate analysis and first analyze how changes in the prices of 
monitoring technologies impact monitoring. I first explore monitoring by the husband and make 
use of the following reduced form specification: 
ηεγββα ,21 iidisoi Rppy i ++++=      (10) 
where yi is (a1) the number of visits home13, (a2) whether or not at least one sibling is “following 
the affairs of the husband’s rural wife”, and (a3) whether the husband indicates that remittances 
depend on whether the wife has submitted a budget. Lastly, (b) yi indicates whether or not urban 
husband i remits to his siblings. Variable  is the price of sibling monitoring measured by the 
number of siblings to the husband and  is the distance (in hours travel) to the rural home. 
s
i
p
d
i
p iR   
is a vector of variables that plausible affects the returns to monitoring; the number of siblings of 
the wife, years of education of both husband and wife, the wife’s age, rural female unskilled 
wage (the local unskilled daily wage a woman living in the village could get when working on a 
neighboring farm – a common means to supplement farm incomes), and, since land markets are 
very illiquid, farm acreage. Controls for the three main language groups in Kenya (Bantu, 
Nilotic, Cushitic) are also included, as are the husband’s earnings in the month prior14. 
Estimations 2, 4, and 7 in table 2 additionally control for ownership type of the rural farm and 
the number of children (0-5 and 6-18). The error term, ηε ,i captures unobserved heterogeneity 
and is assumed to follow a normal distribution and to be independently distributed across 
                                                 
13 The dependent variable asked “how often do you visit your rural home” and respondents could choose from (1) 
never, (2) at least once a year, (3) at least every 3 months, (4) at least once a month, (5) at least once a week, and (6) 
every day.  
14 The main findings are robust to exclusion of the husband`s earnings. 
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districts of origin but correlated within districts of origin15. The results in Table 2 are conform 
propositions 1 and 2 of the model16.  
[Table 2: Visits Home, Sibling Monitoring, and Submission of Budget by Wives] 
 
Husbands Monitoring Wives First, the results show that monitoring takes place in 
ways that are consistent with the assumption of the cooperative bargaining and moral hazard 
models that information is valuable and worth investing in. In particular, the own-price effect on 
monitoring type is negative (proposition 1). Husbands whose rural homes are further away from 
Nairobi make significantly fewer visits home. At the mean travel time of 4.07 hours, an increase 
by 10% will reduce the number of home visits by 7.1% (column 1). Likewise, for each extra 
sibling to the husband (i.e. a reduction in the price of sibling monitoring), the likelihood that at 
least one of them monitors the wife’s home affairs increases by 2.8% (column 3). Second, the 
cross-price effects are positive (proposition 2). Evaluated at the means, an increase in travel time 
of 10% will increase the likelihood of sibling monitoring by 0.86% (column 3), and an increase 
by 10% in the number of siblings (i.e. a decrease in the price of sibling monitoring) will reduce 
home visits by 0.97% (column 1). In other words, home visits and sibling monitoring are 
substitutes. Note that these reduced form coefficient estimates may be biased toward zero 
because of sample selection induced by marital matching. To see this, suppose that variation in 
search costs induces two types of marital matches: altruistic (a) and selfish (s). In rural areas 
close to Nairobi, couples of both types will engage in split migration since even if the match is of 
the s type, information is relatively inexpensive to obtain. In rural areas far from Nairobi, only 
couples in type a marriages will opt for split migration. Hence, altruism will be positively 
correlated with travel time. A similar argument can be made for selection on the number of 
husband siblings. Hence, even if costly information acquisition due to increased travel time or 
fewer siblings would reduce reliance on visits home and sibling monitoring, respectively, this 
marital selection induced selection on unobservables would mitigate these effects. In other 
words, these are lower bound estimates. For the third set of estimations, with regards to the 
budget requirement, it is not clear what the own price is. The price of sending a message with 
budget details through a friend, via mobile text, or via a letter is unlikely to vary with transport 
                                                 
15 Kenya counts 69 districts. 
16 The sample is restricted to migrants only and excludes 15 percent of husbands who were born in Nairobi.  
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time. Consistent with proposition 2, columns 5-6 show that distance to the rural home increases 
the budget requirement, thus suggesting it substitutes for the reduction in visits home and 
complements increased sibling monitoring. More husband siblings, which enable more sibling 
monitoring and reduced home visits, does neither reduce nor increase budget requirements.  
To understand what motivates such monitoring I next explore what non-price variables 
affect monitoring such as demographics and variables around land. Clearly, the coefficients on 
these variables in the home visits estimation must be interpreted with caution since they are not 
always marginal affects  purely of ‘monitoring’, but may partly reflect other motivations for 
visiting.  
First, concern about the wife’s efforts or ability in child care does not seem to motivate 
monitoring. The presence of children in either age category has no significant effect on sibling 
monitoring or budget submissions, nor does the presence of young children increase home visits. 
In the context of the public goods model above, this may suggest that the wife’s marginal 
propensity to spend resources and time on child related goods is high. The value of requiring 
budget submissions may lie more in restricting the allocation of non-child expenditures that 
come after the wife has met a certain threshold of expenditures on child goods. That the rural 
presence of children in the ages 6-17 does increase home visits (column 2) without affecting 
sibling monitoring or budgets suggest that these visits are unlikely to be motivated by 
monitoring. Perhaps the father simply wants to spend time with his children and/or there are 
complementarities between the mother’s and father’s time in raising teenage children. 
Second, budget requirements are more likely for women who can earn higher daily casual 
wages in the rural area (e.g. by working on a neighbor’s farm, a nearby factory etc.) without 
affecting visits home or sibling monitoring. This would be consistent with the idea that husbands 
are more likely to require justification (through budgets) for the need to remit if their wives can 
more easily earn independent incomes.  It also suggests that siblings may not be able to monitor 
the wife’s expenses well. 
Third, older women are significantly less likely to be monitored by their husbands’ 
siblings than younger women. This finding is consistent with a number of hypotheses. First, 
sample selection: if poor spousal matches lead to spousal separation, then older couples in the 
sample should be better matched, and thus require less monitoring than younger ones. Second, it 
is consistent with the hypothesis that husbands may have greater fears that their wives will 
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engage in extra-marital affairs when they are young. However, it is also consistent with the idea 
that her management (including her time allocations) of the farm is motivating such sibling 
monitoring, either because younger women spend relatively more time caring for crops over 
which they have more ownership as a way of insurance in a still risky split marriage, or because 
younger women are less experienced on the farm.  The latter is also supported by the fact that the 
age of the wife does not affect budget submissions, since budgets are unlikely to be a good 
indicator of her farm management. Older women do not receive fewer home visits, but the 
reduced need for monitoring through home visits may well be confounded here with life cycle 
effects that increase home visits as the couple grows older. That concerns about farm 
management motivate monitoring is also supported by increased sibling monitoring and visits 
home as farm size increases. Farm size does not increase budget submissions but these are again 
unlikely to provide valuable information on farm management. Similarly, the coefficients on 
land ownership type further support the idea that husbands are concerned about farm 
management. Husbands are considerably more likely to engage in sibling monitoring if not they, 
but their wives own the farm (at 2%, a rare event), and significantly less likely to engage their 
siblings if landownership is joint. Joint land ownership (26% of couples) is also significantly less 
associated with the budget requirement. In situations where there is no rural farmland, the 
husband is similarly less likely to have siblings monitor or have remittances depend on budget 
submissions. He is, however, significantly more likely to visit.  
Lastly, recall that the notion of ‘divided loyalties’ appealed both to differing incentives 
over land management as well as the need for the wife to invest in informal insurance 
arrangements through her own extended family as well as the extra demands for financial 
support that come with more in-laws. The impact of the latter is explored with the variable on the 
number of siblings to the wife, which is indeed associated with significant increases in the 
budget requirement. The presence of more in-laws does not raise husband sibling monitoring, but 
as mentioned above, sibling monitoring is unlikely to provide valuable information on her 
expenses. In fact, it is actually associated with a significant reduction in sibling monitoring. One 
possible explanation for this reduction points to the simultaneous increase in visits home as the 
number of siblings to the spouse increases. If husbands opt to visit home more frequently (and 
depend also more on budget submissions) in situations where the wife has more dependents, 
there is less need to rely for siblings to monitor, for example, farm affairs. A similar explanation, 
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supported by the regression evidence on remittances discussed below, is that migrants shift from 
remitting cash to remitting in kind goods (which are more difficult to transfer) when the number 
of siblings by the wife increases. If in-kind goods require more frequent visits home that could 
similarly reduce the need for sibling monitoring.  
 In sum, sibling monitoring and budgets are used more frequently when travel becomes 
costly. However, sibling monitoring seems more effective in monitoring her actions and budgets 
more effective in monitoring expenses. There is little evidence that concerns about child 
allocations are motivating monitoring. Rather, concerns about her farm allocations and possibly 
extra-marital affairs are more likely determinants. 
 
Wives Monitoring Husbands The survey did not interview rural women and thus 
does not contain detailed information on, for example, sibling (to the wife) monitoring of the 
husband’s actions. I am, however, able to explore whether visits to the husband are similarly 
inversely related to the size of her sibling network and whether women indeed ask older children 
to live with the husband as was suggested by some.  
[Table 3: Visits by the Wife, Grown Boy/Girl Living with Father] 
The results on urban visits by the wife show the opposite as rural visits by the husband: 
the number of her siblings, especially urban siblings, affects her urban visits positively rather 
than negatively. Distance to the urban area, on the other hand, does reduce urban visits. The 
husband was also asked to estimate how many people he knows from his rural village that have 
similarly migrated and now live nearby in the same slum. Column 2 controls for this and also 
shows that there is no indication that the presence of community members reduces the number of 
visits she makes. These findings suggest that neither siblings nor community members in the 
slum play an important role in monitoring. However, it does not imply that she does not use 
other monitoring strategies such as these visits themselves. Columns 3 and 4 test for the 
hypothesis that some women will send a first born child to live with the father to keep an eye on 
his actions, provided the child is old enough. Indeed, column 3 shows that boys in the ages 10-18 
are significantly more likely to be living with their father in the urban area the further away the 
rural home. Thus for wives, this suggests that urban visits and having a grown boy in the urban 
area are substitutes. Column 4 shows that the same significant relationship between distance and 
the father’s age does not hold for girls. The distance effect disappears also altogether for boys 
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and girls under the age of 10.17 Lastly, column 3 also shows that conditional on the total number 
of boys 10-18, older fathers are less likely to be living in the urban area with a boy aged 10-18. 
This is consistent with the idea that the wife’s need to monitor her husband’s actions is less for 
couples who have managed to live split for longer periods. 
 
Remittances to Siblings  Migrants were also asked about their remittances to 
siblings. Indeed, remittances to monitoring siblings were more common; 45 percent of 
monitoring siblings received support from the migrant husband, compared to 30 percent of non-
monitoring siblings, financial support especially. Table 4 investigates proposition 3 of the model, 
which stated that if the wife lives together with the migrant husband in the urban area, siblings 
do not add “valuable” signals about the wife’s actions, but they do in split migration. An increase 
in the price of traveling home ( ) should therefore have no effect on remittances to his siblings 
among joints, but should among splits.  
dp
 
[Table 4: Remittances to Siblings; Split vs Joint] 
The first regression limits the sample to split migrants, the second to joint migrants. 
Consistent with the monitoring model, it shows that conditional on the total number of siblings, 
an increase in travel time home increases the likelihood that the husband remits to his siblings. 
Also consistent (but inconsistent with the altruism model in which visits were valued for their 
own sake) is the reverse finding for joint migrants: the further away their rural home of origin, 
the less likely they are to remit to their siblings. If anything, this suggests joint migrants display 
‘sibling-avoidance’.  
 
Remittances to the Wife  As explained in proposition 4, the effect of remittances is 
ambiguous depending on what motivates remittances, how risk averse the husband and wife are, 
and the riskiness of home and farm production. In the moral hazard model, when remittances 
serve to compensate the rural wife, more information through increased monitoring will induce 
lower average remittances to the risk-averse wife. Instead, when public goods consumption 
motivates remittances, more information is likely to increase remittances. The following 
                                                 
17 Results available on request 
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econometric specification explores the relation between (the cost of) information and 
remittances: 
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where yi is now (a) the amount of cash remittances (in Ksh) to the rural wife in the past four 
months by migrant i, (b) the value (in Ksh) of remittance made in-kind, and (c) the share of in-
kind remittances in total remittances. Variables and  are visits home and sibling 
monitoring, respectively, which were the dependent variables in the previous regressions. They 
are instrumented in each regression with the total number of siblings of the husband and distance 
to the rural home (incl. its square). This follows directly from the moral hazard model above. 
Again, R
d
im sim
i  is the same vector of plausible variables that affect the returns to monitoring. The error 
term, ηε ,i , is defined as above. Table 5a shows the reduced form estimates and Table 5b shows 
the (GMM) estimates with sibling monitoring and visits home instrumented. 
[Table 5a and b: Remittances to Wife] 
   The reduced form estimates in columns 1, 2, and 3 of table 5a indicate that there is no 
significant relationship between the cost of sibling monitoring and travel time on the one hand 
and the value of cash remittances, remittances in kind (valued by the respondents in Ksh), and 
the share of in-kind remittances in total remittances on the other hand. This is consistent with the 
ambiguity in the predictions, although  the sample selection problem due to unobserved 
heterogeneity in the spousal match described above may also be biasing these results away from 
the prediction by the public goods model that increased information will generally increase 
remittances.  
Columns 4a and 4b in Table 5a look at the extensive margin of remittances and predict 
whether husbands give any cash (column 4a) or in-kind (column 4b) remittances. The results 
show that the likelihood of sending any amount of cash does in fact decrease with travel time. 
Note also the significant coefficients on farm ownership type in these last two columns: migrants 
are more likely to send cash transfers to their wives if they (i.e. the husbands) are not the sole 
owners of the rural land. Column three similarly shows that relative to couples where the 
husband owns the land, the share of in-kind remittances is lower in all other land ownership 
types. This could either reflect the type of marital match, the risk that remittances will be 
diverted if the wife has more limited land rights, or some combination. In either case, this result 
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and the finding that cash remittances are less likely if monitoring becomes costly is consistent 
with the model above where husbands will opt to remit in ways that reduce the risk of diversion 
if information becomes costly.  
Lastly, the estimations in table 5b replicate those in table 5a except that travel time home 
and the number of siblings are now used to instrument the number of visits home and sibling 
monitoring. Except for the finding that more visits to the spouse increase in-kind remittances, the 
other coefficients are not significant. Again, this could reflect the ambiguous prediction, but the 
estimation itself is also likely problematic since the first stage F statistic for sibling monitoring is 
5.64, which suggests the instruments are weak. Finally, column 3 indicates that an increase in the 
number of siblings to the wife increases the share of in-kind remittances in overall remittances. 
Information and Efficiency In sum, these monitoring and remittance findings 
underscore the importance of information for family decision-making in a context where spousal 
conflict over the allocation of marital resources is likely to arise. The findings indicate several 
efficiency losses caused by costly information acquisition. First, there are the direct costs of 
monitoring, including bus fares, remittances to monitoring siblings, and adolescent children 
moving to Nairobi to live with the father.  As mentioned above, split couples spend $119, or 12% 
of the husband’s annual urban income (and nearly a quarter of per capita GDP), on bus fares 
alone. Of course, some of these visits would take place even if information was perfect, but even 
modest reductions in the frequency of visits (perhaps even compensated for by longer duration) 
would generate substantial savings. Second, the remittance results suggest that despite the 
monitoring, husbands do not always remit in ways that are consistent with efficient family 
decision making. For example, the fact that husbands are less likely to remit cash if the rural 
home is far suggests efficiency losses. Similarly, the coefficients on landownership indicate that 
husbands reduce remittances or switch to in-kind remittances whenever conflict over farm 
allocations is likely to arise. And third, there may be negative welfare consequences for some of 
the teenage boys who move to the urban slum to live with the husband when distance makes 
personal travel costly. But the results also show ways in which households manage to mitigate 
efficiency losses: for example, by shifting toward in-kind remittances rather than cash. In fact, 
the observation that households invest substantially in monitoring itself indicates that the welfare 
gains from doing so must be large.  
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Most of the efficiency losses from costly information acquisition may not be happening 
on the intensive margin (among split migrants), but rather on the extensive margin as increases in 
the cost of monitoring reduce the benefits of split migration relative to no- and joint migration. A 
comparison of travel time indicates that the rural homes of joint migrants are, on average, almost 
25% further from Nairobi than those of split migrants (five hours instead of four). In other 
words, costly monitoring may be pushing families to move into the Nairobi slums, despite its bad 
living conditions which leave especially young children at much higher health risks; still, a 
cooperative joint migration outcome in a bad living environment may be preferred to a non-
cooperative split migration outcome in a better environment. 
Household Allocations and the Marriage Market  As emphasized by Becker 
(1973) and others since, as long as people are forward looking, the allocation of resources within 
marriage should be an important determinant of marriage market behavior and vice versa. Given 
the welfare gains for some of cooperative behavior in split migration over (i) non-cooperative 
behavior in split marriages and over (ii) joint (or no-) migration, and the fact that cooperative 
behavior in split marriages becomes more difficult to enforce in an environment of imperfect 
information, we should expect that men and women seeking to undertake split migration will be 
willing to make substantial investments into marital search that enriches their marital information 
set. This hypothesis is explored in the first two columns of table 6, which provides a comparison 
of marriage market outcomes between split and joint migrants: (1) whether the couple co-habited 
before marriage; and, (2) the length of time couples have known each other at the time of 
marriage.  
[Table 6: Marriage Market Characteristics] 
Indeed, controlling for cohort and language group effects and clustering on district of 
origin, couples undertaking split migration are 8.8 percentage points more likely than joint 
migrants to have co-habited before marriage, 55% compared to 46%. They have also known each 
other a bit longer before marriage, although this result is not quite significant (p-value is 0.123).  
Column (4) also indicates that wives in split households have significantly fewer sibling (0.6) 
than wives in joint households. This is consistent with idea that in-laws make split migration 
risky (recall that in-laws increase home visits, the budget requirement, and there is some 
evidence that they increase the share of remittances in kind).  Hence, having fewer in-laws would 
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facilitate cooperative outcomes in split marriages. Column 4 further shows that the husband’s 
family was 19 percentage points more likely to be richer than the wife’s (prior to marriage) in 
split than joint couples. One similar explanation could be that her poorer relatives provide a less 
attractive insurance opportunity, thus providing her with fewer incentives to divert resources 
toward her own relatives and invest more relations with her wealthier in-laws, thus adding to the 
benefits of split migration.  
Finally, columns 5 and 6 show that wives in split marriages are 30 percentage points 
more likely to receive in-kind bride price. Such pre-marital transfers may serve various functions 
consistent with the idea that entering into a split migration relationship is risky, especially for 
women. It can simply serve as insurance to the wife; for example, a cow which can provide a 
source of income even if the husband is not remitting. It could also serve as a costly signaling 
device where potential husbands “willing” to undertake cooperative behavior signal to potential 
spouses and differentiate themselves from “unwilling” types (Camerer, 1988) or as a 
commitment device as in Carmichael and MacLeod (1997), who develop a model which shows 
that a social convention requiring the use of certain types of “inefficient” gifts at the beginning of 
the relationship can support long-term cooperation by making it costly for a partner to undertake 
a strategy of playing non-cooperatively in the current marriage when the spouse behaves 
cooperatively, switching marriage partners, and repeating this.  
In short, consistent with Becker’s prediction, these comparisons of marriage market 
characteristics suggest that the information set within marriage is crucial and thus becomes 
endogenous to marital search.  
    
Section 6: Conclusion   
The evidence presented in this paper supports the assumption that access to information 
on the actions of others has important implications for household decision making. In the context 
of Kenya, it helps explain sibling relations, residential locations of household members such as 
the teenage boys moving to the urban area, and can help explain the co-existence of split and 
joint migration. It would be interesting to see if several recent developments in Kenya (and 
countries with similar migration patterns) interact with these in ways consistent with these 
empirical observations. For example, the new Kenyan constitution (which was rejected in a 
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referendum) included clauses that gave more equal rights to land and inheritance for women. 
Would this lead to more split migration and reduce marital search? Or, the rapid increase in 
mobile phone ownership, observed not just in Kenya but throughout the developing world, which 
according to data from APHRC rose from 9% of households in 2003 to 47% in 2006 in these 
same slums. Does this enable more cooperative and thus efficient outcomes? Similarly, the 
evidence in this paper may explain the rise of websites aimed international migrants wishing to 
send in-kind goods rather than cash. For example, one such website for Kenya18, allows people 
to pay directly for school fees, electricity bills, phone vouchers, fuel vouchers, etc. Will such 
websites stimulate more remittances to Kenya and other countries? More generally, the evidence 
in this paper supports not only the common assumption that the information set is a critical 
determinant of household behavior, but also that members of households will seek to enrich this 
information set whenever the gains from doing so will be large, both through monitoring and the 
marriage market. As such, it adds an important dimension to our understanding of household 
decision making processes. 
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Apendix: Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1: Split Migrant Characteristics 
Variable Mean St. Deviation N
Age husband 36.45 7.76 508
Age wife 29.83 7.21 502
Years of schooling husband 9.34 2.61 510
Years of schooling wife 8.11 2.45 510
Last month's earnings (67 Ksh = 1USD) husband 6177.35 3220.88 469
Number of children 3.08 1.91 507
No. of children <6 in rural home 1.04 0.86 510
No. of children 6-17 in rural home 1.47 1.44 510
No. siblings head 4.75 2.44 510
No. siblings spouse 4.31 2.45 510
Women daily casual wage (Ksh) in rural home 84.22 35.94 510
Acres of farm land- access by wife 4.57 7.40 510
Husband owns farm (prop.) 0.28 0.45 509
Wife owns farm (prop.) 0.02 0.13 509
Joint owners farm (prop.) 0.26 0.44 509
Other owns farm (prop.) 0.36 0.48 509
No farm (prop.) 0.08 0.27 509
Transport time (hours) to rural home 4.07 2.59 510
No. annual visits home husband (lower bound) 10.65 11.23 507
No. annual visits urban area wife (lower bound) 3.08 3.92 507
Husbands w/ at least one sibling following wife affairs (prop.) 0.35 0.48 510
Wife submits budget before husband remits (prop.) 0.74 0.44 502
Husbands remits to siblings (prop.) 0.41 0.49 510
Cash remittances (Ksh) to wife past 4 months 4444.48 4220.01 510
Inkind remittances (Ksh) to wife past 4 months 1347.92 2533.20 510
Couple lived together before marriage (prop.) 0.56 0.50 509
Years know each other before marriage 2.31 2.45 505
Brideprice cash (Ksh) 6066.80 11777.03 488
Brideprice included in-kind gifts (prop.) 0.66 0.47 488
Wife's family richer before marriage (prop.) 0.16 0.37 505
Equal wealth before marriage (prop.) 0.51 0.50 505
Husband's family richer before marriage (prop.) 0.33 0.47 505
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Table 2: Visits Home, Sibling Monitoring, and Submission of Budgets by Wives 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Visits Home Visits Home
Sibling 
Monitoring
Sibling 
Monitoring
Wife 
Submits 
Budget
Wife 
Submits 
Budget
Wife 
Submits 
Budget
No. siblings head -0.021** -0.020** 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
No. siblings spouse 0.039*** 0.039*** -0.011** -0.018** 0.011** 0.011** 0.012**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Transport time to home/spouse -0.301*** -0.299*** 0.070** 0.078** 0.031 0.026*** 0.027***
(0.046) (0.050) (0.029) (0.032) (0.036) (0.009) (0.009)
Transport time home squared 0.015*** 0.015*** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of schooling husband 0.021 0.015 0.006 -0.011 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.013) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Years of schooling wife 0.017 0.020 -0.014 0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.021) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Women daily casual wage -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acres of land- access by spouse 0.004* 0.004** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Monthly income (log) husband 0.140*** 0.162*** 0.002 0.006 0.073* 0.073* 0.066
(0.047) (0.046) (0.029) (0.026) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
Age wife 0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005* -0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Wife owns farm (leftout = husband owner) -0.175 0.466*** -0.060
(0.280) (0.170) (0.199)
Joint owners farm (leftout = husband owner) -0.040 -0.284*** -0.103*
(0.071) (0.074) (0.056)
Other owns farm (leftout = husband owner) 0.030 0.019 0.001
(0.084) (0.065) (0.047)
No farm (leftout = husband owner) 0.209* -0.197*** -0.197***
(0.118) (0.052) (0.070)
Number of rural children between 0-5 -0.032 -0.007 0.008
(0.035) (0.024) (0.026)
Number of rural children between 6-17 0.042* 0.000 -0.017
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015)
Language group controls (Bantu, Nilotic, Cushitic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 496 495 496 495 491 491 490
R-squared 0.3501 0.3625 0.0460 0.1270 0.0489 0.0489 0.0652
OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Robust standard errors (cluster on district of origin) in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Probit: marginal probabilities (dprobit) reported  
The number of home visits was also estimated Poisson regressions – the significance of the 
coefficients is nearly the same19
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Poisson results are available upon request 
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Table 3: Urban Visits by Rural Wife and Children Living with Husband 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban Visits by 
Wife
Urban Visits by 
Wife
Boys 10-18 
w/ husband
Girls 10-18 
w/ husband
No. siblings head 0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.000
(0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001)
No. siblings spouse 0.031*
(0.016)
No. urban siblings spouse 0.071** 0.006 0.014
(0.028) (0.016) (0.016)
Transport time to home/spouse -0.038 -0.033* 0.028* 0.011
(0.046) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008)
Transport time home squared 0.000 -0.002* -0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000)
Years of schooling husband -0.013 -0.010 0.005 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.002)
Years of schooling wife 0.037** 0.031* -0.005 0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.002)
Women daily casual wage 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Acres of land- access by spouse 0.008*** 0.007*** -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Monthly income (log) husband 0.219*** 0.218*** -0.004 0.004
(0.050) (0.052) (0.019) (0.007)
Age husband 0.004 0.006 -0.003** -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000)
Wife owns farm (leftout = husband owner) -0.450* -0.425* 0.072 0.005
(0.248) (0.239) (0.108) (0.011)
Joint owners farm (leftout = husband owner) -0.022 -0.008 -0.028 -0.009
(0.099) (0.106) (0.022) (0.008)
Other owns farm (leftout = husband owner) 0.105 0.121 0.031 -0.006
(0.099) (0.099) (0.028) (0.007)
No farm (leftout = husband owner) -0.168 -0.144 0.021 0.019
(0.143) (0.148) (0.056) (0.025)
Number of rural children between 0-5 -0.054 -0.049
(0.050) (0.051)
Number of rural children between 6-17 -0.008 -0.009
(0.017) (0.017)
Total no. of boys between 10-18 years 0.080*** 0.011
(0.024) (0.010)
Total no. of girls between 10-18 years 0.031* 0.010
(0.016) (0.009)
Knowing # people from origin community in -0.022 0.019 0.016
urban slum: 1-10 (leftout = 0) (0.145) (0.040) (0.011)
Knowing # people from origin community in -0.047 -0.011 -0.002
urban slum: 11-30 (leftout = 0) (0.175) (0.032) (0.004)
Knowing # people from origin community in 0.157 -0.003 0.002
urban slum: 31-50 (leftout = 0) (0.153) (0.038) (0.010)
Knowing # people from origin community in 0.092 -0.007 -0.006
urban slum: 50+ (leftout = 0) (0.131) (0.038) (0.009)
Head consumes alcohol 0.042 -0.012 -0.007
(0.069) (0.019) (0.007)
Language group controls (Bantu, Nilotic, Cush Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 500 495 498 498
R-squared 0.1046 0.1162 0.1098 0.0844
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Robust standard errors (cluster on district of origin) in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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 Table 4: Remitting to Siblings (Split versus Joint Migrants) 
(1) (2)
Remit to 
husband siblings 
(Split)
Remit to 
husband siblings 
(Joint)
No. siblings head 0.021*** 0.020***
(0.007) (0.006)
No. siblings spouse 0.014 0.010
(0.015) (0.008)
Transport time to home/spouse 0.102*** -0.029**
(0.035) (0.013)
Transport time home squared -0.007*** 0.002
(0.003) (0.001)
Years of schooling husband -0.012 0.020*
(0.010) (0.012)
Years of schooling wife 0.030*** 0.007
(0.008) (0.009)
Women daily casual wage 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Acres of land- access by spouse -0.000 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003)
Monthly income (log) husband 0.185*** 0.110***
(0.033) (0.039)
Age wife -0.007*** -0.004
(0.002) (0.004)
Language group controls (Bantu, Nilotic, Cushitic) Yes Yes
N 496 564
R-squared 0.0885 0.0615
Probit Probit
Robust standard errors (cluster on district of origin) in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Probit: marginal probabilities (dprobit) reported  
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Table 5a: Remittances to the Rural Wife – reduced form 
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b)
Cash (Ksh) 
Remittances to 
Wife
In-kind (Ksh) 
Remittances to 
Wife
Share In-kind 
Remittances
Positive Cash 
Remittances to 
Wife
Positive In-kind 
Remittances to 
Wife
No. siblings head -58.165 15.121 0.003 -0.004 -0.008
(66.915) (26.288) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
No. siblings spouse -4.229 24.942 0.005 0.001 0.019**
(57.271) (19.606) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
Transport time to home/spouse -69.440 11.793 0.005 -0.035* 0.002
(287.012) (147.884) (0.018) (0.020) (0.031)
Transport time home squared 10.672 -6.824 -0.001 0.004** -0.000
(22.730) (12.069) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Years of schooling husband 56.065 16.906 0.010* -0.006 0.020***
(86.861) (81.247) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Years of schooling wife 15.268 30.177 -0.005 0.000 -0.009
(109.962) (79.887) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Women daily casual wage 0.535 -4.089 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(3.548) (4.288) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Acres of land- access by spouse -1.685 4.491 0.001 -0.002 0.001
(13.612) (11.182) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Monthly income (log) husband 1,935.845*** 711.184*** 0.012 0.030* 0.126**
(283.382) (162.502) (0.032) (0.018) (0.056)
Age wife 65.097** -14.612 -0.005*** 0.000 -0.007**
(29.668) (14.476) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Wife owns farm (leftout = husband owner) 1,037.135 -1,904.886*** -0.326*** 0.091*** -0.250
(1,315.691) (334.855) (0.048) (0.028) (0.218)
Joint owners farm (leftout = husband owner) 1,773.891*** -1,110.772*** -0.169*** 0.145*** 0.182***
(607.150) (275.528) (0.033) (0.020) (0.067)
Other owns farm (leftout = husband owner) 1,041.027* -1,452.483*** -0.226*** 0.182*** -0.015
(530.334) (274.744) (0.037) (0.022) (0.075)
No farm (leftout = husband owner) 445.641 -1,325.436*** -0.242*** 0.088*** -0.139*
(563.570) (201.753) (0.039) (0.029) (0.084)
Number of rural children between 0-5 -140.052 -108.257 -0.010 0.026 0.055**
(182.578) (91.709) (0.011) (0.020) (0.023)
Number of rural children between 6-17 -36.223 69.959 0.004 0.007 -0.000
(150.702) (85.541) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017)
Language group controls (Bantu, Nilotic, Cushitic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 495 495 463 492 495
R-squared 0.1437 0.1334 0.1310 0.1982 0.0984
OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit
Robust standard errors (cluster on district of origin) in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Marginal probabilities reported in columns 4a and 4b  
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Table 5b: Remittances to the Rural Wife  
(1) (2) (3)
Cash (Ksh) 
Remittances to 
Wife
In-kind (Ksh) 
Remittances to 
Wife
Share In-kind 
Remittances
Is there a sibling monitoring wife -2,468.650 410.552 0.116
(1,878.053) (724.275) (0.179)
Visits head to spouse -532.186 477.655** 0.027
(470.366) (239.509) (0.033)
No. siblings spouse -26.012 19.173 0.006*
(58.490) (21.530) (0.004)
Years of schooling husband 48.298 41.972 0.011
(82.289) (69.000) (0.007)
Years of schooling wife 46.426 6.242 -0.006
(114.138) (73.504) (0.009)
Women daily casual wage 1.570 -6.399* -0.000
(3.298) (3.730) (0.001)
Acres of land- access by spouse 9.443 7.085 0.000
(16.747) (10.121) (0.002)
Monthly income (log) husband 2,010.883*** 581.622*** 0.005
(276.154) (132.400) (0.030)
Age wife 51.275* -14.962 -0.004*
(28.451) (15.320) (0.002)
Wife owns farm (leftout = husband owner) 1,986.825* -1,865.248*** -0.354***
(1,197.167) (467.943) (0.095)
Joint owners farm (leftout = husband owner) 1,085.024 -934.257*** -0.137***
(789.832) (203.676) (0.044)
Other owns farm (leftout = husband owner) 1,124.445** -1,392.953*** -0.226***
(548.428) (258.501) (0.041)
No farm (leftout = husband owner) 34.898 -1,366.074*** -0.223***
(638.882) (252.313) (0.055)
Number of rural children between 0-5 -175.164 -98.571 -0.007
(165.662) (97.882) (0.011)
Number of rural children between 6-17 -13.830 53.229 0.001
(169.576) (80.846) (0.012)
Language group controls (Bantu, Nilotic, Cushitic) Yes Yes Yes
N 495 495 463
R-squared 0.0836 0.1170 0.0717
GMM GMM GMM
P-value Hansen J-statistic overid test 0.7771 0.2666 0.6529
Robust standard errors (cluster on district of origin) in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
First stage F-statistic (weak instruments): (1) Is there a sibling monitoring the wife = 5.64
First stage F-statistic (weak instruments): (2) Visits head to spouse = 44.71
Estimations 4, 5, and 6: Sibling monitoring and visits to rural spouse are instrumented with No. of siblings head, Travel
time, and Travel time squared  
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 Table 6: Marriage Market Characteristics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lived 
together 
before 
marriage
Years known 
before 
marriage
Number of 
siblings 
spouse
Husband's 
family richer 
before 
marriage
Cash amount 
brideprice
Paid inkind 
brideprice
Split household 0.088*** 0.246~ -0.599*** 0.191*** 233.365 0.298***
(0.032) (0.154) (0.121) (0.048) (572.020) (0.032)
Language group controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Bantu, Nilotic, Cushitic)
Cohort controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1061 1045 1066 1054 955 955
R-squared 0.0159 0.0254 0.0373 0.0065 0.0238 0.0804
Probit OLS OLS Ordered Probit OLS Probit
Robust standard errors (cluster on district of origin) in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
~ p-value: 0.123
Probit: marginal probabilities (dprobit) reported
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Appendix: Comparative Statics: 
 
Proposition 1  An increase in the price  of signal  will lead to a decrease in the 
amount  being purchased if 
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variance of the measurement error will increase benefits by reducing the expected transfer level. 
Whether a reduction in the variance leads to a relatively large reduction in the expected transfer 
level (and thus a large increase in the expected benefits) when the variance is large (causing the 
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Denominator: The denominator is given by: 
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Proposition 2  An increase in the price  of signal  will lead to an increase in the 
amount  being purchased:  
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The comparative static is given by: Numerator: 
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 whenever the latter is positive.  
 
Denominator: Same as above. 
Appendix: Survey Description 
A total of 37 household heads (2 %) refused to participate in the survey. All the members 
of the survey team were from these two informal settlement areas, many of them being university 
students. All 20 field officers received six days of intensive training during which they were 
tested on their knowledge of the survey on multiple occasions. The training also gave them a 
chance to improve the survey by changing the order and wording of certain questions. Prior to 
the survey, the field officers selected four schools and one orphanage in the two slum areas, 
which were given support in the form of books, materials, and maize. Individual respondents 
were not compensated. 
The sub-sample of split migrants used in the analysis is smaller than the original 656 
interviewed.  28 observations were omitted because the reported age of the head fell outside the 
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24-56 interval stipulated by the initial sample frame. 16 observations were omitted because they 
were born in Nairobi. 91 observations were omitted that had one or more missing observations in 
nine key variables used in the analysis. The means in the samples with and without these 91 
observations were almost identical20. Also, 3 observations whose home district was missing were 
omitted. Finally, twelve outlier observations were omitted whose rural homes were either listed 
as being more than 25 hours travel away, whose farm acreage was more than 100 acres, or for 
whom the female unskilled wage was listed as being greater than 200Ksh per day (an 
unrealistically high amount) – the final sample consists of 507 split migrants.  
                                                 
20 The lowest p-value in a two-sided mean comparison t-test was 0.5384, while the average p-value across the nine 
variables was 0.8462. 
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